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Resilience and Risk in the Informal Economy: A study in the regulation of risk 
1. Introduction Scientific  evidence  confirms  that  climate  change  is  already  taking  place  (IPCC,  2007).  Climate change increases the likelihood of extreme weather events such as droughts, floods and  heat  waves,  as  well  as  more  gradual  changes  in  temperature  and  precipitation (Mukheiber and Ziervogel 2007,143).  The individual and community exposure to climate change impacts has increased at rapid rates. While  communities  and  government  are  struggling  to  adapt  to  these  changes,  the increased  vulnerability  to  climate  change  is  an  urgent  development  issue  in  low‐  and middle‐income  economies.  The  poor,  often  with  the  lowest  adaptive  capacity,  are  often more  vulnerable  to  climate  change  impacts  because  of  their  low  economic  and decision‐making capacities. Furthermore research has shown that citizens in poorly governed cities are usually at greater risk than those living in well‐governed cities (Huq et al. 2007). The  urban  working  poor  are  particularly  vulnerable  to  these  changes.  National  climate change  adaptation  plans  have  been  proposed  and  used  as  a  national  level  response  to climate change.  The process of adaptation is not new – nations have adapted to changing climate  conditions  throughout  history  (Mukheiber  and  Ziervogel  2007).  However, sustainable  adaptation  requires  good  governance  and  multi‐stakeholder  buy  in.  The national level adaptation action(s) tend to be disparate from those at the local level. Poor communities in many parts of the world, particularly those in Africa have moved into the informal employment and economic sectors largely as an adaptation response to global and climate changes.   The limited capacity and resources of national government and city governments  have  resulted  in  unsuccessful  adaptation  responses,  further  increasing  the number  of  poor  people  seeking  services  in  the  informal  economy  (GDRC  2010).  For example,  many  African  national  governments  are  challenged  with  providing  tenure  and economic security to the poor in urban centres – often resulting in the poor settling in risk prone areas such as flood plains and in turn increasing their vulnerability (Satterthwaite et al. 2009).  The  poor  have  developed  innovative  and  sophisticated  coping  strategies  in  response  to limited  state  interaction  and  service  provision  and  natural  hazards  (threatening  their livelihoods and economies). Despite these often‐innovative responses, little attention in the literature has been paid to understanding how entrepreneurs in informal business protect their business from environmental risk and sustain their livelihoods amidst the uncertainty and risks associated with climate change. This absence of attention is particularly puzzling because  of  the  opportunities  that  small  informal  business  present  to  overcome  the exceptionally  high  levels  of  poverty  and  unemployment  in  developing  economies.  For instance, the use and importance of rotating savings and credit associations as an insurance 
mechanism has a  longstanding history  in poor communities (Ardener and Burman 1995) but  has  not  been  investigated  as  a  risk  management  tool  –  particularly  to  the  risks associated with climate change. The  collective  risk  management  of  the  poor  can  be  understood  as  insurance.  After  all, ‘insurance  can be described as  the  reimbursement of  an  individual  or business  for  all  or part  of  the  financial  loss  caused  by  an  unpredictable  event  or  risk.  This  protection  is accomplished through a pooling mechanism: each person who is vulnerable to the risk pays a small amount of money (the premium) into the pool, which is then used to compensate those  who  suffer  a  loss.  The  risk‐pooling  mechanism  makes  it  possible  for  the  benefit amount  to  be much  greater  than  an  individual’s  premium  payments’  (Roth  and McCord 2008,7). Poor entrepreneurs in this context are particularly interesting because a key issue shaping  development  within  poor  communities  is  the  ability  of  entrepreneurs  in  these communities to effectively manage risks as they provide a significant number of goods and sustain  themselves  and  provide  work  for  others  (Meagher  2006,  Devenish  and  Skinner 2004) – making insurance very important for this sector. Even with limited resources, entrepreneurs are able to build businesses based on multiple strong ties. Economists and sociologists have pointed out that  in the  informal sector,  it  is social networks  that enforce norms within exchanges (Khavul et al. 2009; de Soto 2000). Despite this ability to thrive in the midst of high risks and uncertainty,  ‘… the urban poor are  not  seen  as  critical  parts  of  the  city  economy  but  as  holding  back  the  city’s  success’ (Satterthwaite 2009,8).  The antagonistic relationship between urban governments and low‐income groups coupled with governments’  lack of accountability to their urban populations (Satterthwaithe et al. 2009,7)  has  had  numerous  detrimental  results.  For  example,  despite  the  knowledge  and resources  available  through  national  disaster  risk  management  departments  in  some countries, the uptake of risk reducing behavior has been slow and the poor remain at risk. This is in part a result of weak ties between the state and its poor constituencies, the effect of which has been an alienation of  the poor. The urban poor exist  largely  in an  ‘informal’ and unregulated economic  environment. This means  that  ‘…much of  the physical  growth and  economic  expansion  in  most  cities  in  low‐  and  middle‐income  nations  take  place outside  any  official  plan  and  outside  official  rules  and  regulations’  (Satterthwaite  et  al. 2009,6).  An  example  of  this  is  that  of  the  increasing  number  of  people  living  in  illegal settlements because they cannot afford to buy, build or rent legal accommodation (ibid). It  is  critical  to  bring  the  poor  back  into  the  development  and  climate  change  adaptation realm because ‘economic informality is central to the world economy, but it remains largely unexamined’ (Khavul et al. 2009), particularly in the risk management literature. Informal businesses  are  difficult  to  study  ‐  perhaps  because  informal  business  often  conjures  up 
images  of  illegality,  exploitation,  evasion  and  lawlessness  ‐  (Castells  and  Portes  1989  in Khavul  et  al.  2009,1220)  but  how  they  are  sustained  amidst  wide  spread  uncertainty warrants some investigation. According  to  traditional  economic  theory,  people  make  rational  decisions,  and  the  only thing that affects their behaviour is relevant information. But we know that the real world and impact are highly subjective (Cleary and Malleret 2006,59). For example, the response to  the HIV/AIDS pandemic  in Sub‐Saharan Africa was widespread humanitarian  food aid but  the  pandemic  was  poorly  managed  at  both  household  and  macroeconomic  levels because  the  response  overlooked  the  socio‐economic,  ecological  and  political  conditions, which contributed to the vulnerability (Holloway 2003).  Social  partnerships  have  been  offered  as  the  solution  to  the  risk  management  problem (Coates et al. 2001).  ‘We need partnerships because most of the problems we will  face  in the 21st century will require multi‐sectoral, multidisciplinary, and multi component efforts” (Richardson  and  Allegrante  (2000)  in  Lasker  et  al.  2001,185)  and  the  multi‐level governance framework holds promise of achieving this. This analysis explores the roles of the  different  levels  of  governance  in  governing  risk  ‐  particularly  the  local  level’s  use  of social networks for community resilience.  The  analysis  will  attempt  to  demonstrate  how  poor  constituencies  contribute  to  their wellbeing and effectively mitigate and adapt to a changing climate to realise development benefits,  and more  importantly  –  community  resilience.  By  looking  closely  at  the  use  of rotating  savings  and  credit  associations  (RoSCAs),  and  particularly  burial  societies  poor communities are able to build social capital and provide social and welfare resources to or themselves.  The analysis reveals that the research group seems to make more use of burial societies as a savings or insurance mechanism than they do savings or credit associations. The analysis concludes  within  the  informal  institutional  boundaries  (e.g.  rules,  values,  and  benefits), there  is  greater  emphasis  on  collective  (than  individual)  action.  This  seems  to  have  a significant bearing on  the choice of  risk management strategy  for  the poor. Furthermore, the findings suggest that the rationale for the choice of burial societies as opposed to other insurance mechanisms is largely based on a moral imperative. 
2. Background and Theoretical rationale Background The  African  continent  is  characterised  by  diversity  ‐  in  its  history,  economic  and  social traditions  (Khavul  et  al.  2009).  But  there  are  also  numerous  commonalities  such  as  the slow  economic  growth,  unequal  distribution  of  wealth.  With  few  opportunities  in  the formal wage economy, many of the African poor engage in informal microenterprise. Also 
common  in  Africa  countries  is  that  the  bulk  of  past  disasters  and  events  have  been associated with weather conditions (Ziervogel and Mukheiber 2007). It is within this broad context  that we  focus on how poor,  informal entrepreneurs protect  their  livelihoods and sustain their businesses. For the purposes of this analysis I will focus on only one research question: What actions 
do  poor  entrepreneurs  take  to  protect  themselves  from  the  impacts  of  these 
environmental risks? Risk in a broader context Risk  managers  are  often  forced  to  act  in  situations  of  ‘non‐knowledge’  or  insufficient knowledge  about potential  outcomes of  human actions or  activities  (Renn 2006,21). The most complex questions emerge, however, when one looks at how society and its various actors  actually  handle  risk.  In  addition  to  knowledge  gained  through  risk  assessments and/or option  generation  and  evaluation  through  risk management,  the decision‐making structure of a society is itself highly complicated and often fragmented.   Apart from the structure itself – the people and organizations that share responsibility for assessing and managing risk – one must also consider the need for sufficient organizational capacity  to  create  the  necessary  knowledge  and  implement  the  required  actions,  the political and cultural norms, rules and values within a particular societal context and the subjective perceptions of individuals and groups (Renn 2006,22).   The governance of risk The governance of risk simply indicates the rules that seek to shape conduct in relation to things identified as risks (O’Malley 2009). As O’Malley highlights however, this governance tends to decentre the state; revealing the various other agencies involved in social ordering (ibid). The shift toward governance through communities (see Osborne and Gaebler 1993), has  translated  into  individuals  taking  responsibility  of  their  own  lives  (as  opposed  to looking to the state as the key provider). This shift in governance has also changed society’s compass reading of risk. “To govern something as a risk is to identify a future condition as being more  or  less  probable,  and  to  set  in  train ways  of  responding  that will  affect  this probability  in  some way”  (O’Malley  2009,4).  This may  include  a  focus  on mitigating  the hazard or widening the risk net using tools such as insurance.  The  growing  concern  and  interest  around  risks  associated  with  societal  progress  and modernization such as those associated with global climate changes further challenge the way in which risk is governed. The uncertainty associated with modernization risks makes the  prediction  of  their  occurrence  difficult  at  best.  The  governance  of  risk  is  therefore largely  under  conditions  of  uncertainty  despite  the  interest  and  commitments  of governments and scientists to identify the risks.  
The governance of risk has taken different forms at differing levels of government – this is particularly  the  case  with  risks  associated  with  modernization  such  as  climate  change. However at all governance tiers, power has been decentralized from the state. One way of grasping  this  decentering  of  the  state  can  be  found  in  Foucault’s  work  on  power  – particularly  disciplinary power.  ‘Discipline  is  a mechanism of  power which  regulates  the behavior  of  individuals  in  the  social  body. This  is  done by  regulating  the organization of space,  time  and  people’s  activity  and  behavior  and  is  enforced with  the  use  of  complex systems  of  surveillance  (O’Farrell  2007).  Foucault  emphasizes  the  use  of  institutions  to enforce discipline is society, for example, churches, schools and prisons.   At the global level, governance embodies a horizontally organized structure of functional self­
regulation  encompassing  state  and  non­state  actors  bringing  about  collectively  binding 
decisions without  superior authority (Wolf 2002, Rosenau 1992). At  this  level,  the climate change  discourse  has  been  debated  through  the  UNFCCC  with  greater  focus  on  climate change adaptation and increased participation by policy makers and academics (Ziervogel and  Mukheiber  2007,145).  For  example,  agreements  such  as  the  Kyoto  Protocol  bind national governments  to agreements meant  to reduce  the vulnerability of  their populace.  Such agreements inherently assume that national governments have the required capacity to execute their plans. In other words, there is the assumption that the institutions called upon  to  take  part  in  reducing  nations’  vulnerability  to  climate  change  are  disciplined enough to carry out their duties but where this is found to be untrue, they can be expected to fulfill these expectations because they are bound by agreements. 
  At  the  national  and  municipal  scales,  governance  describes  structures  and  processes  for 
collective  decision­making  involving  governmental  and  non­governmental  actors  (Nye  and Donahue  2000).  Governing  choices  in  modern  societies  is  seen  as  interplay  between governmental institutions, economic forces and civil society actors (such as NGOs). In this perspective  non‐state  actors  play  an  increasingly  relevant  role  and  become  more important, since they have decisive advantages of information and resources compared to single states (Renn 2006,22). For example,  the City of Cape Town’s Municipal Adaptation Plan  (MAP)  for  climate  change  calls  for  an  integrated  adaptation  plan.  The  plan  further highlights the need for integrating the expertise of government, stakeholders, researchers, the  private  sector  and  civil  society  (Ziervogel  and Mukheiber  2007).  All  of  this  suggests then  that  the  urban  poor  ‐  who most  hard  hit  by  the  impacts  of  climate  change,  are  an important part of the risk governance structures  in their communities. This suggests that the  poor  are  able  to  take  up  a  regulatory  role  which  would  hold  other  stakeholders  to account for commitments made to prioritizing the needs of the poor.  Following the  idea of  informality,  the weak state and the severed relations between state and  society,  poor  communities  govern  risk  in  ways  that  are  appropriate  to  them  as communities.  These  governance  strategies  are  often  driven  by  individual  and  collective understanding of what the risk is and the resources available to respond to it.  Risk Management and response in poor communities  
Risks  are  mental  ‘constructions’  (OECD  2003,67).  They  are  not  real  phenomena  but originate in the human mind. The invention of risk as a mental construct is contingent on the  belief  that  human  action  can  prevent  harm  in  advance.  Humans  have  the  ability  to design different futures, i.e. construct scenarios that serve as tools for the human mind to anticipate consequences  in advance and change, within constraints of nature and culture, the  course  of  actions  accordingly.  The  status  of  risk  as  a  mental  construct  has  major implications on how risk is looked at and responded to (Renn 2006,23).  What  counts  as  a  risk  to  someone  may  be  an  act  of  God  to  someone  else  or  even  an opportunity  for  a  third  party.  Therefore  societies  have  been  selective  in what  they  have chosen to be worth considering and what to ignore (Thompson et al. 1990; Douglas 1990; Beck 1994,9). This selection process is not arbitrary. It is guided by cultural values (such as the shared belief that each individual life is worth protecting), by institutional and financial resources (such as the decision of national governments to spend money or not to spend money on early warning systems against highly improbable but high‐consequence events) and by systematic reasoning (such as using probability theory for distinguishing between more likely and less likely events or methods to estimate damage potential or distribution of hazards in time and space)(Renn 2006,24).   Risk  management  in  poor  economies  is  important  yet  fragile  because  starting  an entrepreneurial  venture  is  clearly  a  risky  economic  activity,  and  under  conditions  of uncertainty, individuals pursue risk reduction strategies that rely on strong ties (Ingram & Roberts, 2000; Lerner, Khavul, & Hisrich, 2007 in Khavul 2009 et al. 1223) However, risk can  also  be  seen  as  a  ‘productive  technology  –  the  technology  of  profit  and  innovation’ (O’Malley 2009,15). The concept of social capital makes sense of these ties as links to actual or  potential  resources whose  profits  accrue  from membership  in  the  group  and  are  the basis of the solidarity (Portes 1998, Bourdieu 1985). Therefore, the stronger the ties in the network, the stronger the social capital and the greater benefits to be to be derived in the group.  Liberal thinking has increasingly promoted risk taking for greater entrepreneurial‐ism but herein lies the dilemma that risk‐taking may equal recklessness (see Wilson 2000). Wilson suggests that to overcome this dilemma, governments and business alike have attempted to create  a  certain  moral  culture  through  which  business  will  regulate  itself.  Here, entrepreneurs  are  depicted  in  terms  of  their  entrepreneurial  fairness,  commitment  to community values, and innovation to morality and ethics – making them a critical part of the social networks within which they operate.  The  ties  that  bind  social  networks  together  vary  in  their  strength  (Granovetter  1973). Weak  ties  are  “superficial  or  causal  and normally  involve  little  emotional  investment  .  .  . they can be thought of as arm’s‐length relationships whose handshake we seek but whose support we cannot count on” (Aldrich 1999,84). Although weak ties are built on “thin‐trust” (Anheier & Kendall  2002),  they  do  link  individuals with  others whose  resources  are  not likely  to  be  similar  to  their  own  (Burt  2005).  On  the  other  hand,  the  defining  feature  of strong  ties  is  that  they  are  “not  governed  by  short‐term  calculations  of  self‐interest  .  .  . 
[and]  contain  an  implicit  principle  of  reciprocal  obligation”  (Khavul  2009  et  al.  1222; Aldrich 1999,82).  
 The  preceding  case  study  demonstrates  the  use  and  preference  for  strong  ties  by  poor informal business owners in Philippi, Cape Town as a risk management mechanism against economic and climate‐related risks. 
 
3. Method Data Source  This analysis is based on data generated from unstructured, in‐depth interviews with small business owners in Philippi, Cape Town. The interviews are part of an ongoing case study to examine how entrepreneurs in (urban) informal settlements define and respond to flood and  fire hazards; what actions  they  take  to protect  themselves  from the  impacts of  these environmental  impacts;  and what  shapes  these  actions  and  how, when  and  by whom or what mechanisms these actions are supported.   The  interviews  took  place  between  June  and  August  2010.  I  examined  18  cases  –  17  of which were interviews with informal entrepreneurs while one was with a representative of a burial society in the area. The interviews typically lasted approximately 3 hours and were conducted at the respondents’ place of business or home. 3 of the 17 businesses were no longer in operation though the business owners indicated that they were interested in re‐opening them. This research method allowed me to analyze the characteristics of resilient informal  business by  comparing  the  risk management  strategies used  in business  still  in operation.  Also,  the  cases  provide  a  clear  contrast  in  the  choice  of  support mechanisms used by the entrepreneurs in times of need to manage eminent risks.   The respondents were asked to identify other (past and current) small business owners in their  community.  The  case  study  method  is  used  in  this  project  because  it  attempts  to explain holistically, the dynamics of a social group (in this case the urban, informal poor) or area of action (environmental change and risk).  Analysis The data analysis followed the data triangulation method to draw on multiple data sources (O’Donoghue  and  Punch  2003;  Denzin  1978).  Specifically,  the  analysis  builds  on  key concerns  as  identified  through  the  interview  questions  as  they  relate  to  the  actions  to protect  businesses  and  the  mechanisms  through  which  these  actions  are  supported.  An interview guide was used  to guide  the discussions and subsequent questions were based on  the  respondents’  willingness  to  talk  about  the mechanisms  and  actions  employed  in their  business  to  manage  risk.  Based  on  the  most  commonly  occurring  concerns  of  the respondents and information counter to expectation I then built and modified the research theme categories. The categories and insights were then shared with my research assistant for cross verification. Where there have been inconsistencies in the interview information and with the literature, I have been revisiting the respondents for clarification.  
 
4. Case study: Victoria Mqenge, Phillippi township ‐ Cape Town  Philippi is one of the largest townships in Cape Town, South Africa. The area is situated in what  is known as the Cape Flats. The term "Cape Flats"  refers to a  large area  in the Cape Town  Metropole  that  appears  to  be  essentially  flat  when  viewed  from  afar.  (Capeflats Nature 2009). Like most black South African Townships,  the history and development of Philippi  is  linked  to  apartheid  policies.  For  example,  most  people  in  Philippi  townships came from the former Ciskei and Transkei homelands in order to be closer to key services such as healthcare, employment and schools  (City of Cape Town, 2007  in Anderson et al. 2009).  Between 1996 and 2001,  the population  in Philippi grew by 48.6% (Erasmus 2005). The percentage  of  unemployed  people  grew  by  15.1%  from  1996  to  43.1%  in  2001.  Of  the population group between ages 15 to 65, 58.59% are unemployed, and 41.41% of the total population  is  employed.  The  income  of  the  employed  in  Philippi  is  low  ‐  82.80%  of  the employed population earns between 0‐R1600 a month (Anderson et al. 2009,16).  The total number of people living in shacks is 54.97%, meaning that more than half of the Philippi population lives in shacks (Anderson et al. 2009,19). In terms of service delivery, 8.5% of people have water in their dwellings, 53. 2% have access to piped water on site and 32.7% access water from public taps (ibid).   The  bulk  of  businessmen  and  women  in  Philippi  operate  their  enterprises  from  their homes while others work  in rented premises. There were no statistics around this at  the time of writing this paper.  Safety nets for the Poor by the Poor 
 As in most black townships  in South Africa, RoSCAs are popular  in Philippi and they take various  forms  which  include  rotating  savings  clubs,  non‐rotating  savings  clubs,  burial societies, stokvels and others (Burman and Lembete 1996). Whatever form they are in, the RoSCAs are characterised by regular contributions of a fixed amount to a common pool for mutual financial, social or entertainment functions (Lukehele 1990). While membership in these associations is voluntary, there is a heavy emphasis on honesty and reliability. As a result  of  their  highly  regulated  membership,  the  associations  are  often  formed  by neighbors,  colleagues or members of  a  church  congregation  (Lukhele 1990,1).  It  is  these bonds that keep the associations in existence.  RoSCAs are not new to South Africans; in fact they can be traced back to as far as the 1930s (Mosala 1986) when they were used as a response to  the high mortality rates associated with  insanitary  living  conditions  in  the  new mining  towns  on  the  Rand.  These  societies soon  grew  in  following  along  tribal,  religious  and  even political  lines  (Lukhele  1990). Of late, the composition of RoSCAs is often mixed in their age group, gender and income group composition. 
 Masakhane1: Savings Societies as insurance Amongst the 16 entrepreneurs that were interviewed in Philippi, 4 were either members of a  savings  society  or  had  accessed  it  in  the  past.  Respondents  mentioned  a  number  of savings and money  lending societies  in  the community. The savings societies had similar characteristics: 
• The groups had a committee ‐ usually its founding members. The committee made the rules of the society and enforced them through rules stated in a constitution. The committee also decided who could become a member and this was largely based on how well they were known to the committee member or in the community. 
• The groups had regular meetings – usually weekly, fortnightly or monthly. Both the members of the society and the committee were expected to attend these meetings, as  issues around  the use and or  lending of  the moneys were discussed. Failure  to attend of  late attendance was penalized by a fine. These penalty fees were used to increase the income of the society. 
• The meetings were opened and closed with a prayer by one of its members. 
• Members of  the society wore a uniform to  the meetings;  this  too was enforced by imposing a fine. 
• Members of the savings society had to borrow money at least once in the society’s financial year. Members could also borrow money to lease out to others outside of the society but this was highly regulated to ensure repayment. 
• The  respondents  said  that  there  were  more  women  than  men  in  the  savings societies.  There  was  one  particular  savings  society  initiated  by  a  group  of  young people under the age of 18. This society had members of school going age. 




had either lost their businesses or the business had survived without any intervention that is additional financial input.  The decision to do nothing at a time when the business was not going well and in need of an income spur was very common among the entrepreneurs. This group of entrepreneurs is  of  particular  interest  in  this  research  because  they  challenge  my  initial  research hypothesis that entrepreneurs make heavy use of savings and lending institutions at times of need. Instead, this group introduced the ideas of ‘faith’ and ‘optimism’ to the research. As many of the respondents in this group would say: ‘…if I don’t have something today, I have hope that tomorrow I will have it’.  Although  some  of  the  entrepreneurs  sought  money  to  support  their  business  –  all  the entrepreneurs  interviewed  had  done  nothing  else  to mitigate  against  the  risks  that  they indicated  as most  common.  Economic  and weather  related  risks were mentioned  as  the most damaging by the entrepreneurs. The most common economic risk was that of a lack of income or financial reserve to support the business when necessary and rain was named as the  most  damaging  weather‐related  risk  as  it  destroyed  sale  goods  in  the  often‐fragile trading structures.  In  fact, one respondent  indicated  that he would not  invest any money into  improving  his  trading  premises  because  it  would  not  add  to  his  profits.  Therefore, despite the fact that the rain was destroying his sale items as a result of unsuitable trading premises, the respondent did not want to invest money towards fixing the premises.  The low uptake and use of savings societies as safety nets and the lack of mitigative action to  protect  one’s  business  raises  a  key  question  in  risk  management  amongst  poor entrepreneurs, namely around the mentalities which influence action ‐ such as not taking any mitigative action to save the business from collapse – rational. Initial analysis suggests that the role of spirituality is what largely influences the worldviews of poor entrepreneurs and that these views are influenced and propelled by other social institutions. In Philippi, burial societies are one such institution that is built on and upholds this type of rationality.  Of Dignity and Optimism:  Burial societies as Insurance Unlike  savings  societies,  the  use  of  burial  societies  was  very  common  amongst  the respondents. There are two main burial societies operating in the Victoria Mqenge area of Philippi, they are Ncedo Burial Society and the Victoria Mqenge Burial Society (VMBS). Both burial societies had operated in Philippi and its surrounds for over ten years and therefore had a large following. 14 of the respondents indicated that they were members of a burial society.  Only  two  of  the  respondents  were  members  of  Victoria  Mwenge  Burial  Society while  there  other  12  indicated  that  they  were  members  of  Ncedo  Burial  Society.  A 
committee member of Ncedo was interviewed but members of the Victoria Mqenge burial society were not been available for interview. The rules that guided the operation of the burial societies were very similar to those of the savings  societies.  However,  the  Ncedo  burial  society  operates  slightly  differently  to  the savings  society  in  that  the  society holds  a bank account  into which members make  their monthly  contributions.  However  the moneys  generated  from penalties  such  as  tardiness are kept with  the  society  treasurer. The monthly  contributions  in Ncedo are  the  same of those of the Victoria Mqenge burial society (R120.00) and principal members pay the same amount  of money  as  their  dependents.  This  amount  is  set  by  the  society  committee  and increases after every couple of years (also determined by the committee). According to the Ncedo burial society committee member, Ncedo is cheaper than getting a policy with  a  formal  insurance  company, which  is why  people  prefer  it.  The  respondent went on  to draw out  some of  the  reasons why Ncedo was  a preferred  insurer  and  these included: 
• Members are buried in the Eastern Cape at no extra cost2; 
• The burial society takes an active part in the burial of its members and even assists in the food preparation on the day of the burial; 
• Members that receive disability grants  from the government are allowed to pay  in the second week of the month when they receive their grants; 
• When members are unable  to pay,  they are allowed to approach the committee to state reasons for which they are unable to make their contributions. If their reasons are  acceptable  to  the  committee,  they  are  given a  grace period of up  to 3 months within which they can pay; 




shared  by  many  of  the  members  of  Ncedo,  formal  institutions  were  difficult  to  engage therefore  there  could  never  be  a  relationship  to  bind  the  agreements  of  the  insurance contract. This was later echoed by another entrepreneur, who when asked of his role in his burial  society  said:  ‘My  duty  is  to  bury  people…my  responsibilities  include  guiding members and being a role model to new members by giving them knowledge on the history of the society’.  This  view  resonates  very  strongly  with  theoretical  ideas  around  ties  in  social  networks commonly  found  used  in  the  social  network  analysis  literature.  Social  network  analysis emphasizes  the  relationship  of  the  actors  in  the  social  system  over  their  individual priorities.  Therefore,  individual  actors  invest  in  relations  within  the  social  system  with expected  returns  (Lin  1999).  Lin  suggests  that  this  networked  investment  enhances  the outcomes because, amongst other things, ‘social relations are expected to reinforce identity and recognition’  (ibid,31). Burial  society  members  and  committee  members  especially,  are  highly  regarded  in  the community. As one  respondent  indicated,  ‘people might  come  to  the meetings drunk but after doing  it  once or  twice  they  realise  that  this  is  not  the place  for  that –  they  start  to behave and come dressed smartly  in their uniforms’.  It became clear that the rules of the burial  society  went  beyond  influencing  the  conduct  of  members  while  at  meetings  and actually  spilled  into  their  personal  lives  and  the  choices  they  make.  For  instance,  the members of Ncedo Burial society are encouraged to be married to their partners if they are living with them or have children with them. The reasons for this are that when people are unmarried, their families and those of their partners often fight over their estate and this is seen as both shameful and devisive. To avoid this,  the members must have a partner and children that are known to the society and they will receive the payout of their insurance. Therefore, children born into a member’s family have to be reported to the burial society as soon as possible and when one gets married they have to alert the society. Even  though  the  rules  of  the  burial  society  were  made  by  the  committee,  they  were embedded in a broader social construct – one which made sense of patriarchal lineage, of social  harmony  and  most  importantly,  of  reciprocity.  According  to  Gulati  and  Gargiulo (1999),  this  type  of  embeddedness  refers  to  the  degree  of  cohesion  in  a  network  –  how close members  in  the  network  are  and  thus  operates  like  a  sub‐culture.  Embeddedness therefore implies the importance of belonging to a concrete set of dyadic relations (Ansell 2003,126).  In  the  Ncedo  burial  society  this  social  constructs  are  upheld  by  penalizing members for not reporting the birth of children or new marriages, they were penalized for not  attending  others’  funerals  and  they  were  encouraged  to  hold  prayer  members  for members’ families that were grieving and even assist in the preparations for the funeral.   
Despite members’ time invested in the society, they seemed to be happy to do this for other members. As one respondent said: “I already know that I cannot do anything on Saturdays because there is always a funeral to attend… I want to be buried in dignity and I want a lot of  people  to  come  so  I  have  to  go  to  the  funerals  of  others”.  One  can  conclude  that  by investing  in  the  funeral society, society members are recognized as dignified members of the  community.  Individuals  clearly  invest  in  these  social  relations  by way  of  committing their  time  but  it  is  unclear  how  they  capture  the  resources  and  privileges  that  are embedded in the relations to gain return. This warrants further investigation. Temporally,  the  longstanding  existence  of  the  burial  societies  in  the  community  suggest that  the  individual  members  and  the  organization  itself  ‘have  developed  in  a  particular communal context. Presumably, the longer a person or organization has been situated in a given context,  the more  they have been socialized  into  the norms of  that context and  the more time they have had to develop informal, locally‐specific knowledge and strategies for working in that context’ (Ansell 2003,127). The large following and time committed to burial societies suggests that they play a critical role  in  the  lives  of  their  members.  Together  with  their  long‐standing  operation  in  the community, burial societies seem to be more than just a safety net and rather an institution to ensure  that common moral ethos are upheld. Perhaps another way of  looking at  these burial societies could be as institutions of moral insurance.  Notwithstanding  their  commitment  to  burial  societies  and  negligible  use  of  savings societies    ‐  it  is very clear  that  the risks of  fire and  flooding are not  the most pressing  to informal entrepreneurs. If anything, the entrepreneurs seemed more interested in insuring against  hardship  of  their  families  after  their  passing,  to  protect  their  position  in  the community and ensuring that they led moral lives. There is greater emphasis on investing in a future life over current or medium‐term lived or probable experiences. At this stage of the research it is difficult to make sense of the entrepreneurs’ preference for death insurance over a means of saving and growing capital for future consumption.   
5. Conclusion The  current  enthusiasm  for  climate  change,  particularly  the  concept  of  climate  change adaptation  and  its  application  to  different  social  problems  and  processes  is  not  likely  to diminish  soon.  The  interest  is  warranted  in  part  because  of  the  real  and  important response to the phenomena. It  is also useful  in that  it offers a  lens through which to  look closely at issues at the environment‐society nexus.   
I have suggested  that  there  is a need  for  closer  interrogation  if  individual and  local  level adaptation  strategies  –  where  social  ties  can  bring  about  greater  control  over  wayward behavior and provide access to resources (Portes 1998). The use of burial societies as one such  institution  suggests  their  usefulness  in  promoting  group  resilience  and  regulating risky behavior. In my view, social capital has a place in the theory around building multi‐level  resilience  from  risk.  The  case  study  has  demonstrated  how  this  is  promoted  and enforced  in  an  informal  context  but  its  transferability  and  incorporation  in  the  formal context is yet to be examined in this ongoing research.  Despite  its positive effects,  it  is unclear how and whether  individuals extract  the benefits born of  their  investments  into  the  social network.  In  the  case of burial  societies one  can perhaps say  that  they benefit  is getting cover at  the  time of death. However,  the analysis suggests  that  individuals  are  also  interested  in  intangible  benefits  such  as  community recognition  and  respect.  Also,  the  role  of  other  social  institutions  such  as  religion  and culture  in  risk management  and  decision‐making  warrants  further  investigation.  This  is particularly important because as the case study reveals, the temporality of the institution plays a  significant  role  in decision‐making because  they are  closely associated with  their knowledge and choice of decision‐making strategy.  The effects and downsides of the institutions of social capital need to be examined further in order  to reveal  the most realistic ways  in which they can be used to promote resilient economies and communities that are better adapted to the impacts of climate change. 
